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230 South 500 East, #400
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Dear Ms. Noonan:
RE:

Gaw v. Linqle - Case No. 890139-CA

As permitted by Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, appellant replies briefly to Respondent's
Memorandum of Newly Uncovered Authority (June 11, 1990).
Respondent argues that three other experts on accident
reconstruction testified at the trial, and thus, there was no
prejudice in striking a fourth expert.
It is true that three accident reconstruction experts
did testify (Probert, Smith and Beaufort). However, the excluded
witness was not an accident reconstruction expert at all.
Rather, he was a human factors research scientist. (See Brief of
Appellant at Point I.)
The testimony of the human factor's research scientist
was completely different from the traffic accident reconstruction
experts. (See Brief of Appellant at Point 1(A).)
An analogy might be an airplane accident. Suppose that
pilots have given expert testimony. Certainly that doesn't mean
that mechanics are then excluded from giving expert testimony.
In this case, appellant sought to prove her case by
putting on evidence from traffic accident reconstruction experts,
as well as somewhat different evidence from a human factor's
scientist.
The ruling of the trial court excluded half of
appellant's case.
Sinc$-rej.y,

ROBERT J. DEBRY
RJD\jn
cc: Counsel of Record
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

A trial court7s ruling is not a matter of discretion,

but is instead reversible error as a matter of law, where the
trial court rules on the basis of a misunderstanding of the law
or the facts.
2.

Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985).

The trial court in the case at bar misunderstood the

facts in limiting the testimony of Ms. Gaw's expert.

The trial

court, by taking the expert's testimony out of context, mistakenly assumed that the expert had declared his inability to offer
opinions of fact.

However, what the expert actually stated was

that he was unwilling to make conclusions of law.
3.

The trial court in the case at bar misunderstood the law

in limiting the testimony of Ms. Gaw's expert.

The trial court

improperly prohibited the expert from offering opinions concerning an ultimate issue of fact below—that is, whether the parties7 behavior at the time of the accident was a reasonable response to the conditions prevailing at the intersection.

Utah R.

Evid. 704; United States v. Kelly, 679 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1982).
4.

The violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes

merely prima facie evidence of negligence, not negligence per se.
Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982); Hall v. Warren, 632
P.2d 848 (Utah 1981) .
5.

The 1986 amendments to Utah's comparative negligence

statute did not adopt a negligence per se standard.
Ann. § 78-27-38 (1987); 1973 Utah Laws ch. 209.

Utah Code

-2-

6.

Dicta from this Court7s opinions in Jorgensen v. Issa,

739 P.2d 80 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), and Hornsby v. Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,
773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1988) does not signal an abandonment of the
long-standing rule in this state that the violation of a statute
or ordinance constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence
rather than negligence per se.
7.

The trial court erred in instructing the jury using a

negligence per se standard.
8.

The trial court erred in entering summary judgment for

the State because Ms. Gaw's original deposition raised issues of
fact as to whether she was confused by the design of the intersection.

Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.

1980).
8.

The trial court erred in suppressing the changes which

Ms. Gaw sought to make to her deposition.

Utah R. Civ. P. 30(e);

Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. 111. 1981).

Because those

changes created issues of fact for the jury, the trial court
further erred in granting the State's summary judgment motion.
9.

The trial court erred in disregarding Ms. Gaw's

affidavit.
1980).

Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.

Because her affidavit raised issues of fact for the jury,

the trial court further erred in granting the State's summary
judgment motion.
10.

An expert witness is not required to state the factual

-3-

basis for his opinion.

Utah R. Evid. 705. The trial court

therefore erred in disregarding the affidavits of Ms. Gaw's experts on the ground that they failed to reveal the factual basis
for their opinions.

International Adhesive Coating Co. v. Bolton

Emerson International. Inc.. 851 F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 1988).

Be-

cause these affidavits raised issues of fact for the jury, the
trial court further erred in granting the State's summary judgment motion.

Bulthuis v. Rexall Corp., 789 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir.

1985).
11.

Both of Ms. Gaw's experts gave in their affidavits a

detailed explanation of the foundation for their opinions therein.

Thomas v. Metz. 714 P.2d 1205 (Wyo. 1986).

The trial court

therefore erred in disregarding these affidavits on the ground
that the experts had failed to reveal the factual basis for their
opinions.

Because these affidavits raised issues of fact for the

jury, the trial court further erred in granting the State's summary judgment motion.

-4-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
MS. GAW'S EXPERT NEVER STATED THAT HE WAS
UNQUALIFIED TO OFFER CONCLUSIONS REGARDING
THE REASONABLENESS OF THE PARTIES' CONDUCT
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE SIMPLY REMARKED
THAT HE DID NOT PURPORT TO OFFER LEGAL CONCLUSIONS. THE TRIAL COURT THUS MISCONSTRUED
HIS REMARK, AND MISAPPLIED RULE OF EVIDENCE
704, IN LIMITING THE EXPERT'S TESTIMONY.
Appellant Fay Gaw proffered the testimony of Slade Hulbert,
a human factors expert.

The trial court limited that testimony.

In their brief, Respondents Jimmy Wray Lingle and Roadrunner
Trucking (hereinafter referred to jointly as "Lingle") do not
contest Mr. Hulbert's expertise.

Rather, Lingle contends that

the trial court's ruling merely reflected Mr. Hulbert's own
statements; that Mr. Hulbert conceded his lack of qualification
to testify concerning the reasonableness of human conduct.

How-

ever, Lingle has taken Mr. Hulbert's statements entirely out of
context.

So, apparently, did the trial court.

A careful exam-

ination of Mr. Hulbert's statements, and a correct application of
Utah R. Evid. 704, reveal that Mr. Hulbert should have been allowed to testify fully.

A.

The Trial Court's Ruling Was Not A
Matter Of Discretion Where, As
Here, The Ruling Was Premised On A
Mistaken View Of The Law.

As a threshold matter, it should be borne in mind that the
trial court's ruling with respect to the admissibility of Mr.

-5-

Hulbert's testimony was not a matter of discretion.

Where a

lower court correctly applies the controlling law, then its decision whether or not to admit testimony is ordinarily discretionary.

That is not the case, however, when the trial court's

decision is premised on a mistaken view of the law or the facts.
It is a well settled axiom of appellate review that
judicial discretion means legal discretion in the exercise of which the court must take account of the law
applicable to the particular circumstances of the case
and be governed accordingly. Implicit is conscientious
judgment directed by law and reason and looking to a
just result. . . . Consequently, if the trial judge
misconceives the applicable law or misapplies it to the
factual complex, in total effect the exercise of legal
discretion lacks a foundation and becomes an arbitrary
act.
Wasserstein v. Swern & Co., 84 N.J. Super. 1, 200 A.2d 783, 786
(App. Div.) (original emphasis; citations omitted), cert, denied,
43 N.J. 125, 202 A.2d 700 (1964); accord In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 658
F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[W]here the matter is discretionary, we will not reverse [but] we may reverse . . . where the
district court misperceives the law or . . . misapplies the
law"); Pitts v. White, 49 Del. 78, 109 A.2d 786, 788 (1954)
("[W]here . . . the court in reaching its conclusion overrides or
misapplies the law, . . . an appellate court will not hesitate to
reverse"); Karl Kiefer Machinery Co. v. Henry Niemes, Inc., 80
N.E.2d 183, 186 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948) ("Action by a court under a
mistake of law is an abuse of discretion"); Braderman v. Brader-

-6-

man. 339 Pa, Super. 185, 488 A.2d 613, 615 (1985) ("[A]n abuse of
discretion will be found . . . if the trial court failed to
follow proper legal procedures or misapplied the law"); State v.
Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d 91, 408 N.W.2d 337, 342 (1987) ("Where a
trial court bases its decision on a mistaken view of the law, its
decision constitutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law").
The Utah Supreme Court has followed a similar standard.
Lopez v. Schwendiman. 720 P.2d 778, 780 (Utah 1986) (appellate
review is deferential "unless the trial court has misapplied
principles of law").

As the court stated in Berger v. Berger,

713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985), "[w]e will overturn the trial court's
judgment where there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law." Id. at 697.
As will be explained below, the trial court's decision to
limit Mr. Hulbert's testimony was based both upon a misunderstanding of the law (Utah R. Evid. 704) and a misapplication of
the law (taking Mr. Hulbert's cautionary remarks out of context).
Hence discretion is not an issue on this appeal.
erred as a matter of law.

The trial court

-7-

B.

Ms, Gaw's Expert Merely Stated That
He Was Unqualified To Offer
Opinions Of Lav, He Never Indicated That He Was Unqualified To
Offer Conclusions Concerning The
Reasonableness Of The Parties' Behavior At The Time Of The
Accident,

Many words have both a common meaning and a legal meaning.
Consider, for example, the word "agreement."

In its common us-

age, "agreement" often denotes unilateral consent (e.g., "he expressed his agreement"), whereas in legal parlance, it signifies
a bilateral meeting of the minds—that is, a contract.

Gurman v.

Stowe-Woodard, Inc.. 302 Mass. 442, 19 N.E.2d 717, 719 (1939);
McCorkel v. District Trustees of Robinson Springs School District
No. 76. 121 S.W.2d 1048, 1052 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
The same is true of the words "reasonable" or "prudent."
These terms have particular legal implications; but also, unlike
such specialized legalisms as "detinue" or "laches," they are
part of everyday speech as well.

Mr. Hulbert never said that he

was unqualified to give an opinion concerning the reasonableness
of the parties' conduct.

To the contrary, he explicitly stated

that, as a human factors scientist, he employed the commonly understood definition of the term "reasonable."

He merely remarked

that he would not offer any conclusions concerning the legal
definition of the term:
Q (by Mr. DeBry): What does the word reasonable conduct mean to a human factors scientist?

-8-

A: Well, I can only speak for myself; but
generally I think that there's a common—
fairly common understanding and that is definitely not the legal reasonable man concept.
. . . [Bjehavior . . . might well be reasonable even though it might not be necessarily
lawful behavior under the law.
(Tr. at 238-39.)

C.

The Trial Court Misunderstood Rule Of
Evidence 704 And, On That Flawed Premise,
Erred In Limiting The Testimony Of Gaw/s
Expert.

Utah R. Evid. 704 provides that expert "[t]estimony in the
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided
by the trier of fact." Rule 704 does not give expert witnesses
unfettered leeway to offer opinions on all ultimate issues,
though.

It is restricted to issues "to be decided by the trier

of fact." Hence Rule 704 does not authorize an expert to make
legal conclusions.

See, e.g., F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Names

Trustees. 810 F.2d 1250 (2d Cir. 1987) (Federal Rule 704 did not
permit expert to testify in breach of contract action that contract was unenforceable for lack of essential terms).

Thus, when

Mr. Hulbert stated that he would not purport to offer any legal
opinions, he was merely adhering to the proper scope of Rule 704.
Simply because Mr. Hulbert could not legitimately offer a
conclusion as to whether the parties were acting as "reasonable"
persons in the legal sense, however, did not mean that he could

-9-

not o f f e r
usaqi

an o p i n i o n a s t o w h e t h e r ,

ml' tin

n

I I ni iii iiiirii I ovc-"d by him

t h e p a r t i e s were a c t i n g r e a s o n a b l y
fact

from t h e commonly u n d e r s t o o d
uman f a c t o r s

urn In i I hi

i i i i .urn,. I iiiiiin v ,

t h e t e r m " r e a s o n a b l e 1 * I s u s e d b^tJ'

that

scientist,
Hie

in common s p e e c h and

l e g a I jaia,joii shoii J d in it tap "i piaa "1 tided hi m from t e s t i f y i n q con cerning

i t s common t i s a n a ,

reasonably
ed by t h e
7

0 4

jum >

,

iii
•

exam.
*.r

in a f a c t u a l

Afttn" a l l ,

•

.

•

: ' S t a t e s v . Ke.ll.y

~r-

:*•-'*.- ai>
*

I h<-» pi: aa I sa

,

L-jLt«.

intent

,

• •

At t r i a l ,

* . . ObeJUUui,

? narcotics round

beei

*-n

* ra

*

.

•

1 *

s t a t itr

* c*

-

* he

ar.r-

,_*
" -

- ^tribute
-

OLIOS

"*^ rervnr&ii

tcau^^. a ,

foregoi

• :;P I t

-"xpert r

*

'

» ^di.ai,
" appp^..

improper!/

* :r>rr ^ \+-&

disagree
" p o r ^ o s s w1*"^

.

.r

•^

*-* defendant's possess.

•itendant ccrtten .
* *h

••

J

• >^

-

i i s u e c o v e r e d by Ru^e

•

stribu*"^

u s e e f™Kr

i s s u e t o be d e c i d -

-• *

attribute.

i na i stat-.it*-

t h e p a i l ia,, m 11 J

s e n s e was t h e u l t i m a t e

JI I am 4 ' rdr;
••

whethei

-1: ed M,la
i

r*+ »y,f t,

.. *

i,.a p u x a L - ^ *,^

a i s t r ~ ' h u t e " was not

,<*»;*

4

~.

.t

and
cause the expert could not t e s t i f y
tarn

u s i n g t h e p i i i d b c u^> .» .. .

a I , i i t d i d n o t mean t h a u ue c o u l d n o t t e s t i f y

i t s common m e a n i n g :

usinj

at

-10-

[T]he testimony is not defective because it utilized
the words of the legal standard. The words, "possess
with intent to distribute," are commonly used and their
plain meaning matches their legal meaning. There was
no danger of confusing the jury.
Id. at 136.
To the extent that the common meaning of reasonableness
varies from the legal meaning, it would have been a simple and
effective precaution to advise the jury that the expert was testifying as to factual matters only, and that they were to draw
their own conclusions in light of the instructions given to them.
There was no need to limit Mr. Hulbert's testimony.
Mr. Hulbert's testimony, moreover, went to the heart of Ms.
Gaw's case.

It was essential to her case.

The practical effect

of the trial court's ruling was to gut Ms. Gaw's case.

Thus it

is a small wonder that the jury returned the verdict it.did.
Lingle's contention in his brief that Mr. Hulbert was allowed to
offer most of his testimony is little solace, and tacitly proposes a rather bizarre notion of trial practice.

It assumes that

a trial court is free to hamstring and debilitate a litigant's
case, in violation of the Rules of Evidence, so long as it does
not exclude the witness altogether.
is neither fair nor sensible.

This "half a loaf" approach

And, in the case at bar, it in-

flicted a gross injustice on Ms. Gaw.
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A.

The Enactment Of Comparative Negligence
Did not Abolish The Prima Facie Standard,

For more than 70 years, the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the violation of a statute or ordinance is merely prima facie evidence of negligence.

See Hall v. Warren, 632

P.2d 848 (Utah 1981); Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30,
395 P.2d 62 (1964); White v. Shipley, 48 Utah 496, 160 P. 441
(1916).

According to Lingle's theory, this long-standing rule

was abrogated by the legislative adoption of comparative negligence, which Lingle characterizes as "the tort reform which occurred in Utah in April, 1986" (Lingle Brief at 17) . Lingle
concedes that "[p]rior to the adoption of the comparative [negligence] system in Utah, violation of a statute or ordinance was
considered prima facie evidence of negligence" (Id. at 18 (original emphasis)), but argues that, in the wake of comparative
negligence, the per se standard is now the law.
If such a radical change occurred, it occurred silently, for
the statute says nothing about abolishing the prima facie
evidence standard.

This silence renders it quite unlikely that

the legislature meant to alter such a well-settled rule.

"In the

absence of express statutory provision, courts will not find an
implied abrogation of long established principles." Williams v.
Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, 68 Cal. 2d 599, 68
Cal. Rptr. 297, 440 P.2d 497, 499-500 (1968).

See generally 2A

C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction
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B.

This Court's Decisions In Jorgensen
And Hornsby Did Not Establish A
Negligence Per Se Standard.

Neither Jorgensen v. Issa, supra, nor Hornsby v. Corporation
of the Presiding Bishop, supra, support Lingle's theory that
negligence per se is now the law of this state.

In Jorgensen. it

was held that no statutory violation had occurred.

Hence any

comments regarding the effect of such a violation were purely
dicta.
Moreover, note the authorities cited in support of that
dicta:
[I]t is well established that violation of a statute or
ordinance is negligence per se which may be excused if
the negligent actor is confronted with an emergency not
his own fault. Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 851 (Utah
1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965).
739 P.2d at 82.

If Jorgensen supposedly bolsters Lingle's con-

tention regarding the effect of the 1986 legislative enactments,
then why does the opinion cite Hall v. Warren, supra, a 1981 case
which explicitly rejected the negligence per se standard?
Equally significant is the reference to the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 288A (1965).

Section 288B of the Restatement articu-

lates the per se rule; § 288A articulates the prima facie
evidence rule.

See Hall v. Warren, supra, 632 P.2d at 851 & n.l.

Apparently, because the "per se" language was dicta, it was used
inadvertently.

As shown by the authorities cited with approval

therein, the Jorgensen opinion was never intended to signify an
abandonment of the prima facie evidence standard.
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case was influenced by the erroneous instruction.

As has already

been pointed out at page 12 of Ms. Gaw's opening brief, there was
ample evidence which the jury could have considered to excuse
Gaw's conduct.

But, because of the trial court's erroneous in-

struction, they were prohibited from taking this evidence into
account.

The per se instruction thus inflicted double harm: it

overemphasized Ms. Gaw's fault while at the same time unduly restricting the evidence which the jury could consider to mitigate
that fault.

The inference of prejudice under these circumstances

is inescapable.

POINT III
BECAUSE THE RECORD RAISED NUMEROUS ISSUES
OF FACT CONCERNING THE DEFECTIVE CONDITION
OF THE HIGHWAY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
The basis for the State's alleged liability was the defective design of the highway where the accident occurred.

The

trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on
the ground that the record was devoid of evidence indicating
defective design.
In fact, however, there were four distinct sources of record
evidence indicating that the highway was defective: (1) Fay Gaw's
deposition; (2) Ms. Gaw's affidavit; (3) the affidavit of Howard
Anderson; and (4) the affidavit of David Beaufort.

But the trial

court found, and the State argues on appeal, that each of these
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1.

The Trial Court Erred In Suppressing The Changes To Ms. Gaw/s Deposition.

Utah R. Civ P. 30(e) authorizes a deponent to make "[a]ny
changes in form or substance which the witness desires to make"
to his or her deposition testimony.

As has been observed in con-

nection with the identical federal counterpart of Rule 30(e), the
broad wording of this authorization entitles a witness to make
sweeping substantive changes, not merely the minor editorial revisions or typographical corrections that the State's narrow
interpretation of Rule 30(e) would allow.

Thus in Lugtig v.

Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. 111. 1981), the plaintiff proposed to
make 69 changes to his deposition.
court's words, "substantive."

Those changes were, in the

Id. at 641.

For example, he

changed answers of "yes" to "no," and answers of "no" to "yes."
He radically changed the estimates of times and distances that he
had given in his deposition.

(Like the case at bar, Lugtig was

an action to recover for personal injuries sustained in a motor
vehicle collision.)

The defendant objected to these proposed

changes, but the court overruled the objections, stating that:
Rule 30(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allows deponents to make "[a]ny changes in form or substance which the witness desires . . .," even if the
changes contradict the original answers or even if the
deponent's reasons for making the changes are unconvincing. . . . The language of the Rule places no
limitations on the type of changes that may be made by
a witness before signing his deposition, . . . nor does
that Rule require a judge to examine the sufficiency,
reasonableness, or legitimacy of the reasons for the
changes. Allowing a witness to change his deposition
before trial eliminates the likelihood of deviations

-19-
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Moreover, what kind of justice would our courts be dispensing if they denied a claimant her day in court because she failed
to observe such picayune technicalities as those raised by the
State?

The defendant in Allen & Co, v. Occidental Petroleum

Corp,, supra, advanced an argument similar to that now made by
the State.

It argued that proposed changes in the deposition

testimony of a plaintiff's witness should be suppressed because
those changes had not been made "by the officer" as required by
Rule 30(e).

The court found this hypertechnicality to be lacking

in merit, and refused to suppress the changes:
There is support in the language of Rule 30(e) for
defendant's position that the witness' changes in his
testimony are to be entered on the deposition "by the
officer." However, this Court is not prone or sympathetic to an overly technical interpretation of the
Rules when there has been substantial compliance therewith and there are no significant policy objectives to
be served by such an interpretation. The Rules are to
be liberally construed.
49 F.R.D. at 340-41; accord Colin v. Thompson, supra.

2.

Even Without The Changes, Ms. Gaw's
Deposition Was, By Itself, Sufficient To Create Issues Of Fact
For Trial.

The assumption of the trial court, and a central premise of
the State's position on appeal, is that Ms. Gaw's original deposition testimony gives no evidence that she was confused by the
intersection in question here.

Thus, in its order granting the

State's motion for summary judgment, the trial court stated that

-21-
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(Deposition of Fay Gaw at 59.)
The trial court therefore erred for the same reason that the
court was found to have erred in Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone,
622 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980).

In that case, the defendant had

given deposition testimony and then later submitted a conflicting
affidavit.

The trial court there ruled that the affidavit could

not be considered, and so entered summary judgment for the plaintiff.

The appellate court reversed because, at one point in his

deposition, the defendant had made a statement at odds with the
balance of his testimony.

That one internal contradiction, held

the court, precluded summary judgment even on the basis of the
deposition alone:
[T]he alleged inconsistency in the affidavit
existed within the deposition itself.
Accordingly, the issue . . . was appropriately raised by the deposition even without consideration of the affidavit.
Id. at 894.

Likewise here, the internal contradictions in Ms.

Gaw's deposition precluded summary judgment.

B.

Fav Gaw's Affidavit Raised Issues
Of Fact.

After her deposition, Ms. Gaw submitted an affidavit (R.
1093-95).

In that affidavit, she explained that she had been

confused during her deposition—specifically, that she had been
under the mistaken impression that the accident had taken place
in the merge lane when, in fact, it had taken place in the
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Gaw's affidavit reveals otherwise.

The affidavit explains quite

lucidly the reason why Ms. Gaw was mistaken—that is, she was
proceeding on the incorrect assumption that she was familiar with
the intersection in question when, in fact, she had been confused
all along.

She was so confused that she mistook the through lane

for the merge lane.

This confusion not only undermined her depo-

sition testimony, but also led to the accident in which she was
injured.

"An inconsistent affidavit may preclude summary judg-

ment . . . if the affiant was confused at the time of the deposition and the affidavit explains those aspects of the deposition
testimony."

Miller v. A.H. Robins Co.. 766 F.2d 1102, 1104 (7th

Cir. 1985).

That is precisely the situation here.

The conflict between Ms. Gaw's deposition and her affidavit
created a question of credibility for the jury, not an issue of
law for the trial court.

See Guarantee Insurance Agency Co. v.

Mid-Continental Realty Corp.. 57 F.R.D. 555, 563 (N.D. 111. 1972)
("Defendants seek to have this Court ignore the conflict in
Freedman's [affidavit] statements by suggesting that the deposition is the more credible statement.

The Court refuses to make

such a determination when ruling on a motion for summary judgment") . For this very reason, the court in Tippens v. Celotex
Corp., 805 F.2d 949 (11th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 815 F.2d 66
(11th Cir. 1987), reversed a summary judgment in which the trial
judge had disregarded an affidavit which contradicted the
affiant's deposition testimony:

-25-

il !li i i opposing party * s affidavit should be considered
although it differs from or varies [from] his evidence
as given by deposition or another affidavit and the two
in conjunction may disclose an issue of credibility.'11,
6 Moore's Federal"'Practice f 56.15[4] (2d ed. 1985)
(footnote omitted)
The purpose of summary judgment is to s e p a r a t e
real, genuine issues from those which are formal or
pretended. To allow every failure of memory or variation in a witness's testimony to be disregarded as a
sham would require far too much from lay witnesses and
would deprive the trier of fact of the traditional opportunity to determine which point in time and with
which words the witness (in this case, the affiant) _i
stating the truth. Variations in a witness's testimony
and any failure of memory throughout the course of discovery create an issue of credibility as to which part
of the testimony should be given the greatest weight if
credited at all. ---.sues concerning the credibility of
witnesses and weight of the evidence are questions of
fact which require resolution by the trier of fact.

similar effect is Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bene, supra,
, so ievert* • -

..,..- ,r^irnept- -

Certainly, every disc, -^^cy contained in an affida^
does not justify a distr. t court's refusal to give
credence to such evidence.
I . jf - *>t *
jury's role in resolving questions w! credibility *
district court should not reject rh*-- content of an
affidavit even if it is at -jd-l-i . t statements mad*
an earlier deposition,
62 2 E .2d tt

; the Kennett-Murray case, as ,

**? case vz

bill , I h o
timOfVy ,

IS

affLUav

inqls'i the uuuri u^^

*

,*

explain*"*

' lie

LUiituSivli*

n^ v.

.

u*ut xc **~u i3een error to disregard the af-

fidavit:
Even assumi ng that th+- Imposition was unequivocal,
Bone's affidavit served to create a genuine issue which
would preclude summary judgment. Bone's affidavit did
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not purport to raise a new matter, but rather to explain certain aspects of his deposition testimony.
Bone states that he was confused during the deposition
and at one point thought that the questioning concerned
the promissory note whereas in fact it related to the
signing of the employment contract.
Id.

Just as the affiant/deponent in Kennett-Murray had been con-

fused between a promissory note and an employment contract, so
likewise was Ms. Gaw confused between the merge and through lanes
of the intersection.

Whether her confusion was credible was a

question for the jury.

C.

It was error to disregard her affidavit.

The Anderson Affidavit Raised
Issues Of Fact.

Neither the trial court nor the State questioned Howard
Anderson's credentials as an expert.

Nor is there any doubt that

his affidavit, if considered, is enough to create an issue of
fact precluding summary judgment.

In it, Mr. Anderson attested

that the intersection "fails to meet accepted standards of safety
in highway design" and "is defective and dangerous" (R. 1327).
The trial court refused to consider the Anderson affidavit
because Mr. Anderson stated his conclusions therein "without
foundation" and because "they do not specify what standards the
State did not follow or should have followed in this case" (R.
1353).

The State uses these same arguments to defend the trial

court's ruling on appeal.
However, the trial court erred both as a matter of law and
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as a matter of fact. As a matter of law, an expert witness's
failure to state the foundation for his opinion does not render
his opinion inadmissible.

Hence, even assuming, arguendo, that

Mr. Anderson had not explained the foundation for his conclusion,
the trial court was still mistaken in excluding his affidavit.
Moreover, as a matter of fact, Mr. Anderson did explain the
foundation for his conclusions.

He did so in painstaking detail,

he specified the standards that the State violated, and he pointed out what the State did wrong.

1.

It Was Unnecessary For Anderson To
State The Basis For His Expert
Opinion.

Utah R. Evid. 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or
inference and give his reasons therefor without prior
disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event
be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on
cross-examination.
(Emphasis added.)

Although the issue appears to be one of first

impression in this state, the federal courts and other jurisdictions which have, like Utah, adopted the identical federal version of Rule 705, have held that, under Rule 705, "the basis for
the [expert's] opinion need not be disclosed as a condition for
admitting the testimony."

International Adhesive Coating Co. v.

Bolton Emerson International, Inc., 851 F.2d 540, 544 (1st Cir.
1988).

The court in State ex rel. Human Services Department v.
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Colemanf 104 N.M. 500, 723 P.2d 971 (Ct. App. 1986), for example,
stated as follows:
When a witness has been qualified as an expert in a
particular field, in the absence of a ruling by the
trial court which requires the expert to disclose the
basis for his opinion as a prerequisite to stating his
opinion on matters within his area of expertise, he
need not state the reasons for arriving at his opinion.
In such case, the cross-examiner has the responsibility
of probing the material factors underlying the expert's
opinion if those matters are sought to be questioned.
723 P.2d at 975; accord Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 177 111.
App. 3d 1034, 532 N.E.2d 1091, 1101 (1989) ("the expert may give
an opinion without disclosing the facts which underlie or support
his opinion"); Jones v. Sanilac County Road Commission, 128 Mich.
App. 569, 342 N.W.2d 532, 538 (1983) ("an expert may give opinion
testimony without first disclosing the underlying facts for his
opinion"); State v. Johnson, 215 Neb. 391, 338 N.W.2d 769, 771
(1983) (holding that an expert "could render such opinion even
without first giving the underlying basis for that opinion");
Cherry v. Harrell, 84 N.C. 598, 353 N.E.2d 433, 438, review
denied, 320 N.C. 167, 358 S.E.2d 49 (1987) ("an expert need not
reveal the basis of his opinion").
In light of Rule 705, it is reversible error for a trial
court to grant summary judgment on the ground that expert affidavits filed in opposition to the motion fail to state the
foundation for the experts' opinions.

A case very much on point

is Bulthuis v. Rexall Corp., 789 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1985).
plaintiff there brought suit against the sellers of the drug

The
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diethylstilbestrol (DES) alleging that she had contracted cancer
as a consequence of her mother's ingestion of DES while the
plaintiff was a fetus. The defendants moved for summary judgment
on the ground that the record was devoid of evidence indicating
that the plaintiff's cancer was causally related to her mother's
ingestion of DES.

In opposition, the plaintiff submitted the

affidavits of two physicians who attested that, in their
opinions, the plaintiff's cancer had indeed been caused by DES.
The trial judge refused to consider the physicians' affidavits
for the same reason that the trial court here refused to consider
Mr. Anderson's affidavit; namely, because of the supposed lack of
foundation.

Accordingly, the court entered summary judgment.

The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial judge's refusal to consider the experts' affidavits had violated Rule 705:
The district court held the declarations of
Doctors Townsend and Sack were insufficient to defeat
summary judgment, stating:
Although expert testimony may defeat summary
judgment, the declaration must put forward
facts or a reasonable basis for the opinion.
A declaration which simply presents an expert
opinion without factual support is inadequate
to defeat summary judgment.
It is not clear whether the district court ruled
that a declaration of expert opinion was not admissible
evidence without a recitation of the facts upon which
the opinion was based, or that such a declaration in an
affidavit, though admissible, was insufficient to
create an issue of disputed fact barring summary judgment in the circumstances of this case. We think the
ruling was wrong on either ground.
By the express terms of Fed.R.Evid. 705, *[t]he
expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and
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give his reasons therefore without prior disclosure of
the underlying facts or data unless the court requires
otherwise" in this case; it simply accorded the declarations of opinion no weight and granted summary
judgment against plaintiff.
Id. at 1317.
Similarly in the present case, the trial judge did not require Mr. Anderson to state the basis for his opinion.

Nor did

the State attempt to depose him in order to ascertain the basis
for his opinion.
fidavit.

The trial court simply disregarded his af-

In so doing, the court committed reversible error.

2.

Anderson Thoroughly Explained The
Basis For His Opinion.

Contrary to the trial court's belief, Mr. Anderson did explain how he reached his conclusion.

First of all, he listed the

data that he had reviewed:
I have been provided a diagram of the layout of
the Route 6-Poplar Avenue intersection. A reduced copy
of that diagram is attached to this affidavit. I have
reviewed the police reports and photographs. I have
read the deposition of Fay Gaw and her affidavit. I
have reviewed the traffic court data consisting of the
average daily traffic count. These materials are
customarily relied upon by highway design professionals
in analyzing the safety of an intersection.
(R. 1327.)

An expert's statement of the records he has reviewed

in making his conclusion constitutes an adequate disclosure of
the basis for that conclusion.
1208 (Wyo. 1986).

Thomas v. Metz, 714 P.2d 1205,

In addition, Mr. Anderson stated that the

materials he had reviewed were those customarily relied upon by
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highway safety experts.
clusions.

This further substantiates his con-

See Utah R. Evid. 703; Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,

Inc.. 682 P.2d 832, 839 (Utah 1984).
But Mr. Anderson did not stop there.

He went on to cata-

logue in exacting detail why the intersection was defective, and
what the State should have done.

The most effective rebuttal to

the State's assertion that Mr. Anderson failed to disclose the
foundation for his opinion is the text of the affidavit itself:
6.
In my opinion, the intersection design for
drivers turning left from Poplar Avenue onto Route 6
fails to meet accepted standards of safety in highway
design. As a result of these failures, the intersection is defective and dangerous for motorists turning
left onto Route 6. The reasons for my opinions are set
forth in more detail in the following paragraphs.
7.
There are three major intersections in
Helper. They all have relatively heavy turning movements and all are intersections without active traffic
control devices. In looking at the traffic movements
and the high speed road conditions on Route 6, in my
opinion, one of the three intersections should be signalized (i.e. have a traffic signal installed). Even
if traffic movements on any one of the local streets
did not meet all the hourly warrants for a signal, the
signal should be installed because:
a.

A signal would facilitate crossing movements at the intersection. For example,
a vehicle must accelerate approximately
80 feet from the stop bar on Poplar
Avenue to clear the far side of the intersection. This requires a long gap in
traffic and good judgment on the part of
the local drivers crossing this totally
unpatrolled high speed highway.

b.

A signal would inform motorists on Route
6 that they are entering a community
where frequent traffic conflicts can be
expected.
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c.

Most importantly, a signal at any one of the
Helper intersections would provide traffic
gaps for the other two intersections.

8.
The striping and the island are inadequate
and pose a challenge to even a frequent user of the
intersection. An infrequent or first-time user can
easily be mislead into making the wrong decision.
Traffic leaving Poplar Avenue and turning left onto
Route 6 is a relatively high or heavy movement of about
1200 vehicles per day. At conventional divided highways such as Route 6, that left turn movement would be
made onto the far side of the median (shaded in red on
the attached diagram), directly into the through lane,
or into an acceleration lane located directly next to
the through lane. That would be a driver's normal expectancy, and the normal intersection design.
9.
I have never seen a four legged intersection
with a merge lane on the near side of a median, except
at Helper, Utah. Traffic turning left from Poplar Avenue onto Route 6 must turn prior to reaching the divided island, and at that point, conflicts with traffic
turning left from Route 6 onto Hill Street. The left
turn movement onto Hill Street at times will block the
movement of Poplar Avenue traffic on Route 6.
10. The intersection layout separates traffic
traveling in the same direction with an island median,
while separating traffic traveling in opposite directions with a stripe median. This is totally in standard of care conflict with normal engineering
practices. This conflict can and will fail to meet
reasonable driver expectancy.
(R. 1327-30 (emphasis added).)

Included in the foregoing ex-

planation is Mr. Anderson's articulation of the very standards
supposedly omitted from his affidavit:

"[T]he intersection . . .

fails to meet accepted standards of safety in highway design" (R.
1327) and "is totally in conflict with normal engineering
practices" (R. 1330).
To be sure, Mr. Anderson stated in his affidavit that he did
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not yet have in his possession all the accident data, that he had
not yet visited the accident scene, and that his opinions were
accordingly "subject to some modification after I make further
analysis and obtain all the facts" (R. 1330).

But those caution-

ary remarks are not, as the State attempts to mischaracterize
them, "admissions . . • that [Mr. Anderson] has insufficient
facts upon which to base an opinion" (State's Brief at 12). They
are merely qualifications which any conscientious expert would be
expected to make.
ity.

At most, they go to the question of credibil-

They do not warrant the exclusion of Mr. Anderson's

affidavit:
[T]he fact that an expert's opinion may be tentative or
even speculative does not mean that testimony must be
excluded so long as opposing counsel has an opportunity
to attack the expert's credibility. . . . When the
factual underpinning of an expert's opinion is weak, it
is a matter affecting the weight and credibility of the
testimony—a question to be resolved by the jury.
International Adhesive Coating Co. v. Bolton Emerson International, Inc.. supra, 851 F.2d at 545 (citations omitted).
Given the extensive explanation given by Mr. Anderson, it
cannot be seriously contended that his affidavit is so wholly
lacking in foundation as to be speculative or useless to the
trier of fact. Any supposed deficiencies in the factual data
affect the weight of his affidavit, not its admissibility.
Loudermill v. Dow Chemical Co., 863 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1988)
("the factual basis of an expert opinion goes to the credibility
of the testimony, not the admissibility"); McAlester v. United
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Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 1259 (10th Cir. 1988); Alabama
Power Co. v. Courtney, 539 So. 2d 170, 173 (Ala. 1989); Jones v.
Sanilac County Road Commission, supra, 342 N.W.2d at 538;
Jostens, Inc. v. Mission Insurance Co., 360 N.W.2d 344, 348
(Minn. 1985) ; Liquid Energy Corp. v. Trans-Pan Gathering, Inc.,
758 S.W.2d 627, 638 (Tex. App. 1988).

D.

The Beaufort Affidavit Raised
Issues Of Fact.

The trial court disregarded the Beaufort affidavit for the
same reasons that it disregarded the Anderson affidavit (R.
1353).

The preceding discussion concerning the Anderson af-

fidavit therefore pertains here as well.

Mr. Beaufort was not

required to articulate the basis for his conclusions.
Evid. 705.

Utah R.

Nevertheless, like Mr. Anderson, he did explain how

he reached those conclusions.

Having already scrutinized the

extent of Mr. Andersons factual basis, Ms. Gaw will not belabor
the point with respect to Mr. Beaufort.

Suffice it to say that

Mr. Beaufort7s explanation covers over two pages of text (R. 85355), and leaves no doubt that his conclusion is premised on an
adequate foundation.

Whether that foundation is sufficiently

convincing to make his conclusions persuasive is a question going
to the weight of Mr. Beaufort7s testimony.

His affidavit, like

Mr. Anderson's, should have been considered.

Consequently, the

trial court erred in granting the State's motion for summary
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j udgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is submitted that the
trial court erred in granting the State's motion for summary
judgment, and that Ms. Gaw was deprived of a fair trial by the
unwarranted limitations on her expert's testimony, by the giving
of negligence per se instructions to the jury, and by the giving
of further instructions to the jury which overemphasized Lingle's
status as the favored driver.

The briefs filed by Lingle and the

State have done nothing to dispel this ineluctable conclusion.
Ms. Gaw therefore respectfully urges this Court to reverse the
judgment below with directions that Ms. Gaw be granted a new
trial, not only against Lingle, but also against the State.

DATED this

day of October, 1989.
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OP TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
INC., a Utah corporation, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 860323-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 15, 1988.
State Department of Transportation
brought action to enforce its rights under
stipulation, pursuant to which outdoor advertising company had agreed to remove
two billboards. The District Court, Rodney
S. Page, J., found that Department was
estopped from removing signs, and Department appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Greenwood, J., held that company failed to
establish injury necessary to successfully
assert either equitable estoppel or laches
defense.
Reversed.
Equity *»84
Estoppel *»52.15
Highways *=»157
Costa incurred by outdoor advertising
company in constructing two billboards did
not result from state Department of Transportation's five-year delay in enforcing stipulation pursuant to which signs were to be
removed, and thus costs could not serve as
injury necessary to successfully assert eq-

though company indicated that costs of
construction were not recovered for eight
or nine years after billboards were constructed, construction was completed before parties entered into stipulation, and
company in fact used billboards for at least
four years beyond date permitted by stipulation.
David L. Wilkinson, State Atty. Gen.,
Donald S. Coleman, Mark C. Moench, David
S. Christensen (argued), Physical Resources Div., Asst. Attys. Gen., 'for plaintiff and appellant.
Douglas T. Hall (argued), Salt Lake City,
for defendant and respondent.
Before GREENWOOD, ORME and
BILLINGS, JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Plaintiff, the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT), appeals from the trial
court's ruling that UDOT was estopped
from removing two of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc.'s (Reagan) billboards because UDOT waited five years before taking action to remove the billboards. We
reverse.
In September 1976, Reagan constructed
two billboards on U.S. Highway 89 in Davis
County, Utah. After an administrative
hearing in September 1977, UDOT determined that the billboards violated the Utah
Outdoor Advertising Act. Utah Code Ann.
§ 27-12-136.l-.il (1984). Reagan appealed, and, before the appeal was heard, the
parties entered into a stipulation and dismissed the appeal. According to the stipulation, the billboards were to be removed
on or before July 1981, unless they had
attained conforming status under the Utah
Outdoor Advertising Act.
In May 1986, UDOT sent a letter to
Reagan and advised Reagan to remove the
signs because they had not attained conforming status in accordance with the stipulation. Reagan refused to remove the
signs, claiming that they were conforming.

Because the parties were unable to settle
their dispute, UDOT commenced an action
to enforce its rights under the stipulation.
The court ruled that the billboards were
nonconforming because they were not in
commercial or industrial zones but that "by
waiting until May of 1986 to take action on
the Stipulation, flu? Utah Department of
Transportation has not acted reasonably
and is therefore estopped from removing
the signs pursuant to the Stipulation.11
On appeal, UDOT claims that the trial
court erred in ruling that UDOT was estopped from removing the billboards. Because it is unclear whether the trial court
relied on equitable estoppel or laches as the
basis of its ruling, we examine the facts of
this case in light of both doctrines.
Before equitable estoppel may be applied, three elements must be present: 1)
an admission, statement, or act inconsistent
with the claim afterwards asserted; 2) action by the other party on the faith of such
admission, statement, or act; and 8) injury
to such party resulting from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate such
admission, statement, or act. Celebrity
Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control
Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979).
Successful assertion of laches requires defendant to establish that plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that
defendant was prejudiced by that delay.
Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147
(Utah 1987).
Under both equitable estoppel and laches, defendant must establish injury or prejudice before the defense may be successfully asserted.1 In this case, Reagan
presented no evidence on the injury it allegedly suffered. During oral argument on
appeal, however, Reagan asserted that its
injury consisted of the construction costs
incurred in building the billboards. According to Reagan, those costs are not recovered for eight or nine years after the
billboards are constructed, and it will be
injured if it is required to remove the signs
1. The Utah Supreme Court has held that estoppel can be asserted against the government only
under certain circumstances, "fT]he critical inquiry is whether it appears that the facts may be

before the construction costs are recouped.
However, Reagan completed construction
of the billboards well before UDOT and
Reagan entered into the stipulation for removal of the billboards. Therefore, Reagan's alleged injury in constructing the billboards did not result from UDOT's delay in
enforcing the stipulation. Accordingly, we
conclude that the asserted injury fails to
satisfy either laches or estoppel due to the
absence of a causal relationship between
the failure to enforce the stipulation and
the injury suffered. In addition, Reagan
used the billboards for at least four years
beyond the date permitted by the stipulation. Thus, Reagan ultimately benefitted
from the use of the signs and was not
injured nor prejudiced by the delay. Therefore, because both laches and estoppel require proof of injury or prejudice, and because it is impossible, under these facts,
for Reagan to have been injured or prejudiced, we hold that the trial court erred in
concluding that UDOT was estopped from
removing the billboards.
Reversed.
ORME and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.

AMERICAN CONCEPT INSURANCE
CO., Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Paul and Penny LOCHHEAD,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 860350-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 16, 1988.
Insurer brought action seeking to have
personal property award determined by ar.be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the
exception." Utah State Univ. v. Sutro <fr Co., 646
P.2d 715. 720 (Utah 1982). In this case, we need
not reach u/h*»»li*»f n « i l « c..*— —«~
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bitrators vacated or r »o liftc' and insureds
counterclaimed for ' *mager arising from
failure to pay arbitration award. The
Third District Court, Dean E. Conder, J.,
entered summary judgment in favor of insurer. Insureds appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) insureds' expert's affidavit, filed in imposition to insurer's summary judgn\
motion, was not improperly conclusor> - insufficient to raise material issue of i ,,
and (2) genuine issue of material fact exi •'
ed as to whether insurer breached duty to
deal fairly and in good faith with insureds,
precluding summary judgment
Reversed and remanded.
1. Insurance «=»602.12(2)
Issue of breach of duty of insurer to
act in good faith is a factual issue to be
determined by jury after consideration of
all attendant circumstances and evidence.
2. Judgment «=>185.1(4), 185.3(12)
Insureds' expert's affidavit, filed in opposition to plaintiff insurer's summary
judgment motion, was not improperly conelusory or insufficient to raise material issue of fact; affidavit set forth expert's
background and experience as licensed
property and casualty claims manager,
stated that expert had examined file of
insurer's adjuster and, based on that examination, concluded that insurer had no just
cause for initiating legal action to have
personal property award rendered by arbitrators vacated or modified and that insurer had breached its duties of good faith and
fair dealing. U.C.A.1953, 78-31a-16, 7831a-17; Rules of Evid., Rule 704.
3. Judgment *=»185.1(4)
Expert affidavit filed in opposition to
summary judgment motion must contain
sufficient factual basis for opinion proffered. Rules of Evid., Rule 703.
4. Judgment *=»181(23)
Genuine issue of material fact existed
as to whether insurer breached duty to deal

award entered by arbitrators, precluding
summary judgment.
Robert H. Wilde, Midvale, for defendants
and appellants.
Dennis C. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs and respondents.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and
GREENWOOD, JJ.

OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellants Paul and Penny Lochhead
(the Lochheads) seek to reverse a summary
judgment in order to proceed against
American Concept Insurance Company
(American Concept) on a counterclaim
which alleges breach of the duty to deal
fairly and in good faith, and seeks consequential damages for intentional damage to
Mr. Lochhead's business relationships and
intentional infliction of emotional distress
resulting in physical injury. The counterclaim is based upon American Concept's
failure to pay an arbitration award pursuant to the terms of an insurance contract.
We reverse and remand.
, The Lochheads suffered fire damage to
their home and personal property on October 18, 1983. American Concept was the
Lochheads' insurer at the time. The parties could not agree on the amount of loss,
and the matter was submitted to a panel of
two arbitrators and one umpire as specified
in the insurance contract. According to the
contract, the arbitration award was binding
if agreed to by any two of the three panel
members. The panel issued three arbitration awards: one for the structure, one for
additional living expenses, and one for personal property. American Concept paid all
awards except the personal property
award.
American Concept then filed an action in
district court seeking to have the personal
property award vacated or modified under
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-16 and 78-31a17 (1977) because of alleged fraud or mistake. American Concept alleged that its
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The affidavit of American Concept's arbitrator, attached to the complaint, stated that the
personal property award was higher than
the actual arbitrated amount. He claimed
it was signed by him only as an accommodation to the Lochheads for income tax
purposes, with the understanding that the
lesser amount would be paid by American
Concept. The Lochheads filed an amended
answer to American Concept's complaint to
include a counterclaim for damages arising
from American Concept's failure to pay the
arbitration award. Judge Conder bifurcated the case, first hearing arguments concerning the validity of the arbitration
award. The court concluded that the arbitration award was presumptively proper on
its face and was not obtained by fraud.
Judgment was entered for the Lochheads,
and American Concept paid the Lochheads
the personal property award. American
Concept then submitted a motion for summary judgment in its favor on the Lochheads' counterclaim, based only on the
record and the testimony of their arbitrator
during the trial. American Concept argued
that pursuant to the decision of the Utah
Supreme Court in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985),
defendants had to establish that American
Concept had refused to pay the full arbitration award and filed suit without any just
cause or excuse. It further contended that
the proceedings in the first portion of the
case established that there was a bona fide
dispute as to the amount of the award,
thus precluding a finding of ''bad faith."
The Lochheads submitted an affidavit of
Milton Beck, a licensed public insurance
adjuster, in opposition to the motion.
Judge Moffat, who was subsequently assigned the case, granted the motion.
At a hearing on the Lochheads' request
for reconsideration, Judge Moffat stated
that he had granted the motion for summary judgment on the basis of the record and
the insufficiency of the affidavit submitted
by the Lochheads to create any material
issues of fact Judge Moffat reaffirmed

(UtahApp. 1988)

The»Lochh«ftdB-contend~Oiuappeal Jhat_
the~summaty~judgment * was-improperly^
granted-because-MrHBeck's affidavit.in ^
opposition to the motion created a material
issue of~fact«as*to whether American Con* ~
cept breached-its obligation^ good, faith _
and fair- dealing.
[1] On appeal from the granting of a
motion for summary judgment, we review
the facts in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the summary judgment.
As stated in Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170,
1172 (Utah 1983), "[djoubts o r uncertainties
concerning issues of fact properly presented, or the nature of inferences to be drawn
from the facts, are to be construed in a
light favorable to the party opposing the
summary judgment." Further, the issue of
breach of the duty of an insurer to act in
good faith is a factual issue to be determined by a jury after consideration of all
attendant circumstances and evidence.
Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co., 746 P.2d 1194 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
Therefore, if any material issues of fact
exist on the record before us, we must reverse and remand.
[2] In the instant case, the sufficiency
of the affidavit presented in opposition to
the summary judgment is determinative.
The trial court apparently viewed the affidavit of Milton Beck as improperly conclusory and hence insufficient to raise a material issue of fact. The Beck affidavit first
seta forth Mr. Beck's background and experience as a licensed property and casualty
claims manager. The affidavit then states
that Mr. Beck had examined the file of
American Concept's adjuster and, based on
that examination, opines that American
Concept had no just cause for initiating the
legal action and breached its duties of good
faith and fair dealing.
Utah^R^Evid^Oi-declarertKarthetestimony of an expert *£is~not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by-the trier of fact"—Because Mr.
Beck's affidavit was offered as that of an
expert, it could legitimately reach conclu-

K A B LAND, INC., Plaintiff
and Respondent,

[3] An expert affidavit must also conv.
tain a sufficient factual basis for the opinion proffered, as discussed in Williams v.
J.A. (Bud) KLUNGERVIK and Karen
Mclby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). "An
Klungervik, Defendants and
affidavit which merely reflects the affiant's
Appellants.
unsubstantiated conclusions and which
No. 860167-CA.
fails to state evidentiary facts is insuffiCourt of Appeals of Utah.
cient to create an issue of fact." In
Williams, an architect's affidavit was
March 16, 1988.
found sufficient to raise an issue of fact as
to the negligent construction of a window,
\
where the affidavit included facts upon
Plaintiffs brought suit against defendwhich his professional conclusion was ants for default in payment of costs and
based. Id. at 726. As in Williams, we expenses of joint venture. The District
find that Mr. Beck's affidavit includes both Court, Richard C. Davidson, J., granted
what he concluded as an expert and an partial default judgment and supplemental
adequate basis for his conclusion, his exam- judgment, and defendants appealed. The
ination of the adjuster's file. Utah R.Evid. Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that: (1)
703 provides that an expert opinion may be plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
based on data "of a type reasonably relied judgment was defective, as it was not supupon by experts in the particular field
" ported by memorandum of points and auMi* Beck's affidavit complies-with Rule 703.* thorities, it did not state any grounds or
by stating that he had examined the adjust-**-\ material undisputed facts, only possible
er's files ajuLderived^hia. expert opinion- supporting affidavit was filed two months
from that,jxaminatiqnj^ The- opinion-was_ * Before motion was made, was mailed directproperly ~ based- on-the-examination-, of _ "ly to defendants, and was not served on
xecorda, and. materials - of^ a . type usually _"defendants' counsel, and no time was fixed
relied upon-by-experts in^his, fie\<L~JSee ~ for hearing on motion and no hearing was
Barson v. KR. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d held, and (2) defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was
832, 839 (Utah 1984).
not so deficient as to warrant striking an[4] Viewing the expert's affidavit in a swer; at most, court might have disregardlight most favorable to the Lochheads, we ed defendants' response in evaluating merfind that it was sufficient to raise an issue its of summary judgment motion.
of material fact as to whether American
Judgment vacated and case remanded.
Concept breached its duty to deal fairly and
in good faith. Therefore, we reverse the
summary judgment and remand the matter 1. Judgment <*=»120
to the trial court for further proceedings
Entry of default is essential predicate
consistent with this opinion.
to any default judgment. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 56(b)(2).
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.

(© f"][M£Mimfiif>

2. Judgment <*»181(14)
Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment was defective, as it was not supported by memorandum of points and authorities, it did not state any grounds or
material undisputed facts, only possible
supporting affidavit was filed two months
before motion was made, was mailed directly to defendants, and was not served on

for hearing on motion and no hearing was
held.
3. Judgment «=*183
Defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was not so
deficient as to warrant striking answer; at
most, court might have disregarded defendants' response in evaluating merits of summary judgment motion.
4. Judgment *=»134
Entry of default judgment by court
with jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, where there is no default in
law or in fact, is regarded as improper or
illegal, and voidable.
J.A. Klungervik, pro se.
JoAnn Stringham, Vernal, for plaintiff
and respondent.
Before GARFF, JACKSON and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
Klungerviks appeal from an adverse
judgment totalling $102,489.50, consisting
of a "partial default judgment" (entered
after striking appellants' answer) and a
subsequent "supplemental judgment" We
vacate the judgment and remand.
On April 10, 1982, a document entitled
"Joint Venture Agreement" was executed.
The first paragraph reads:
J.A. "Bud" & Karen Klungervik as joint
tenants with full rights of survivorship
and P & B Land, Inc. to joint venture and
sub-divide Green Fields Downs, a recorded PUD within Uintah County [sic].
The signature section at the end of the
agreement consists solely of four individuals' signatures—those of J.A. "Bud" Klun1. Although phrased by plaintiff as an action for
default in payments under the joint venture
agreement, the action essentially seeks an accounting of funds advanced to the joint venture
by the McRaes, the principals in P & B Land,
Inc., half of which the Klungerviks allegedly
agreed to pay. An affidavit of Pat McRae, con-

McRae and Pat McRae. Paragraph 4
states that "an earnest money option will
be executed by and between Robert M.
McRae and P & B Land, Inc., the terms and
conditions of which are included by reference." Because the option does not appear
in the record, we do not know if it was ever
executed or exercised. Paragraph 11 contemplates that Robert M. McRae or P & B
Land, Inc. could add additional properties
to the venture. Paragraphs 5 and 6 contemplate an equal allocation of costs, expenses and "excess proceeds" between P &
B Land, Inc. and Klungerviks.
A two-page complaint seeking reimbursement from Klungerviks for joint venture
expenditures was filed only by P & B Land,
Inc. on December 3, 1984. The main allegation was that
3. Defendants have defaulted in the
payment of costs and expenses in failing
to pay their proportionate share thereof
and plaintiff's principals have been
called upon to make said payments.
4. Defendants are in default to plaintiff
in the sum of $22,588.26.
(emphasis added).1 Klungerviks filed a
timely answer that admitted entering into a
joint venture, but generally denied the specific allegations as to what that agreement
said of their responsibilities and liabilities
because no copy of the agreement was
attached to the complaint they received.
Ten days later, on February 11, 1985,
plaintiff filed a one-sentence Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment: "Plaintiff
moves this Court for a Partial Summary
Judgment based on the pleadings and affidavits on file herein." The pleadings on
file were the complaint and answer. The
only affidavits on file were the December
affidavit described in footnote 1 and another Pat McRae affidavit accompanying the
taining a listing of payments advanced by
McRaes to the joint venture and identifying Pat
McRae as a "Joint Venturer in the Agreement
dated April 10, 1982," was mailed directly to
Klungerviks nine days after the complaint was
filed.

